Executive summary

On 17 March 2026, the Mauritius Revenue Tribunal (the Tribunal) sustained the authority's position in a case that turned on statutory interpretation. In Jassi St Expedit Ltée v. The Registrar-General (JSEL v. RG or the case), the Tribunal addressed two critical procedural issues relating to statutory time limits under section 28(3D) of the Land (Duties and Taxes) Act (LDTA):

1. How a relevant calendar month should be calculated
2. Whether formal notification must be made within four months of the statutory timeline if an objection is lodged at the Registrar General (RG)

By a majority decision, the Tribunal held that in determining whether an objection is "dealt with"within four months:

1. The date of lodging the objection is not included in the four-month count.
2. A calendar month runs from one date in a particular month to the same date in the next month.
3. There is no requirement that a formal written notification be issued to the aggrieved party within the four-month period if the RG objection unit (OU) substantively concludes the issue within four calendar months in the presence of the aggrieved party.

This represents a departure from prevailing administrative practice and effectively extends the time available to the RG while reducing certainty for the affected persons. A dissenting opinion highlights that the interpretation is not settled.

The dissenting stance taken by one panel member also demonstrates the independence of the Tribunal and the autonomy of the members of the Tribunal in articulating their views. The inclusion of the divergence of opinion underscores the Tribunal's commitment to ensuring that all viewpoints are considered in reaching a decision. The concerns raised in the dissenting opinion should not be overlooked, as they contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the issues at hand and highlight the importance of thorough discussion within the panel.

Background

Jassi St Expedit Ltd (JSEL) acquired part sociales (i.e., shares) in Société Harbour View from Ascencia Ltd on 25 July 2017. As the Société owned immovable property in Mauritius, JSEL was required to register the deed of transfer.

The RG increased an assessment on 15 January 2018, imposing additional registration duty based on an increased value of the immovable property. Registration duty, though governed by the Registration Duty Act (RDA), may fall within the scope of the LDTA with regard to determining the valuation of immovable property. Section 28 of the LDTA applies to "duties and taxes under this Act" and under section 3 of the LDTA, this includes registration duty.

The 28-day statutory deadline to object to the assessment fell on Sunday, 11 February 2018. Because Sundays are considered as public holidays under the Interpretation and General Clauses Act (IGCA), the last day to lodge the objection was Monday, 12 February 2018. The aggrieved party lodged an objection on 1 August 2022 and the RG accepted it, despite that the objection was significantly out of time.

The OU of the RG considered the objection, and it appears that the OU reached a decision on 25 November 2022 in the presence of the aggrieved party's authorized representative. The OU formally communicated its decision to the aggrieved party on 2 December 2022

The aggrieved party asserted that, under section 28 (3DA) of the LDTA, the formal decision should have been issued prior to 2 December 2022 and therefore the decision that the OU conveyed on 25 November 2022 was not relevant. The aggrieved party contended that the OU of RG was late in issuing the formal notice, thus the objection to the assessment should be deemed to have been allowed.

Issues before the Tribunal

The Tribunal had to decide whether the RG had failed to comply with the statutory requirement that an objection "shall be dealt with … within four months from the date the objection is made" under section 28(3D) of the LDTA. It therefore considered whether:

1. The date of lodging the objection is included within the four-month timeframe.
2. A calendar month runs from one date in a particular month to the corresponding date in the next month.
3. The phrase "shall be dealt with" solely requires a decision by the OU in the presence of the RG or whether it extends to the communication of the determination to the aggrieved party.

Majority decision

The Revenue Tribunal ruled in majority and explained it ruling as follows:

1. The date of the objection is not included in the four-month time limit. The majority relied on section 38(1)(b) of the IGCA to support its views that the date of lodging the objection is excluded from the four-month day count.

In other words, if a statute refers to a number of days between two events, whether expressed by reference to a number of clear days or "at least" a number of days or otherwise, the days on which the events occur shall be excluded in calculating the number of days.

The dissenting opinion

One member of the Tribunal panel expressed a different view, which was annexed to the ruling.

The dissenting view reasoned as follows:

1. The date of lodging the objection should be included in the four-month time limit. The dissenting panel member based her contention on a reading of section 38(1)(d) of the IGCA which states that "where there is a reference to a period of time specified to run from a given date, the period of time so specified shall be calculated so as to include the given day."
2. A calendar month does not mean a corresponding date in the next month but should be viewed strictly according to the Gregorian calendar. In the case of JSEL, if the time limit starts from 1 August 2022 (date the objection was lodged), the first month will end on 31 August 2022, such that the fourth month will end on 30 November 2022. Note, however, that unlike the majority ruling, the dissent does not detail the reasoning behind this interpretation.
3. The statutory four-month period should encompass the whole cycle of the objection process so that it includes both the decision-making and the formal notification of the Tribunal's conclusion.

Implications

The majority's ruling centers on the interpretation of the four-month time limit for a decision in the context of the LDTA. It is clear that the majority rulings on both the commencing date of the time limit and the definition of calendar month favor the RG.

The Tribunal's interpretation in this case likely has far-reaching implications, well beyond RD and LTT.

Corresponding sections of the Income Tax Act 1995 (ITA), the Value Added Tax Act (VATA) and the Customs Act (CA) address the timing of determination notices issued by the Objection Appeal Dispute Resolution Department (OADRD) — see sections 131B(7)(b), 39(4) and 23 (6)(b), respectively. These sections prescribe that the OADRD of the Mauritius Revenue Authority (MRA) is required to determine the case within four months once an objection is lodged.

It is current accepted practice that the date of lodging the objection counts within the four-month period and that a month is calculated as per the Gregorian calendar. The ruling is a departure from common practice and effectively allocates an additional two days for the RG and OADR to reach a determination.

Without going through the merits of the views expressed in the majority and dissenting ruling, note that the mere existence of a dissenting view indicates that the interpretation of the four-month time limit was not a straightforward matter. Some argue that, in cases of uncertainty, a ruling should go in favor of the aggrieved party. Others may contend that, in the interest of fairness and parity, it would be more appropriate if the RG and the MRA were subject to time limits based on a fixed number of days.

The majority's ruling that the notification of the aggrieved party is not included in the term "dealt with" can also be debated. The term "dealing with" implies a counterparty relationship and unless one party informs the other of its decision, it is not discharging its duty of dealing with its counterparty. In other words, unless the RG officially informs the aggrieved party of its decision, the RG cannot have discharged its duty of dealing with the objection.

The Tribunal's ruling risks undermining the protective purpose of section 28(3D) of the LDTA, which is intended to provide certainty to aggrieved parties. Arguably, the objection process should be regarded as complete only when the RG formally communicates the determination to the aggrieved party.

Further, the ITA, VATA and CA clearly state that the MRA must "give written notice" of its determination within the four-month deadline. In applying a strict reading of the law, the Tribunal's majority ruling seems to misalign the provisions of the LDTA with other taxing provisions.

In view of the ruling rendered, it appears that RG and/or the MRA may, on a going-forward basis, issue notices for fiscal matters determined outside the four-month window. Such an approach could cause uncertainty for aggrieved parties attempting to determine whether their cases have been allowed or determined but not yet communicated.

Aggrieved parties should continue to monitor objection timelines carefully and avoid filing objections to assessment in an untimely manner.

Conclusion

The ruling at issue has implications beyond the LDTA. The Tribunal's approach to the computation of the four-month period is likely to influence the interpretation of similar time limits across other Mauritian tax statutes. Critically, for taxes such as income tax, value-added tax (VAT) and customs duty, the legislation expressly requires the MRA to issue a written notification within the statutory period. By contrast, for registration duty and land transfer tax purposes, the Tribunal's ruling suggests that no such notification is required, provided the objection is substantively determined within the four-month period.

This creates an asymmetry in the protection of aggrieved parties. The procedural step of formally notifying the aggrieved party seems essential for certainty, as it is the notification that crystallizes the outcome and enables the party to exercise any further rights of challenge or compliance.

In practical terms, affected parties should no longer assume that the expiry of the four-month period brings finality in registration duty and land transfer tax matters. Affected parties should actively manage and monitor the status of objections accordingly.